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Part IV: Discussions on the State and
Local Level
Chapter 7: Federalism
Asserted Federal Devolution of Public Housing Policy
and Administration: Myth or Reality
Otto J. Hetzel*
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 21, 1998 the Independent Agencies Appropriation Act
for Fiscal Year 1999 became law.1 Title V of the Act, called the
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA or
the 1998 Act), had been tacked onto fiscal appropriations legislation
that provided funds for the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), the federal department responsible for
national housing policy.2 This Appropriation Act was the only
available legislation at the time that provided a potential vehicle for
enactment of substantial revisions in United States public housing
* Professor of Law Emeritus, Wayne State University Law School, Detroit, Michigan.
He holds a J.D. from Yale Law School and an LL.M. from Harvard Law School, and a B.A.
from the Pennsylvania State University. He currently practices law in Washington, D.C. His
clients frequently have included local governments and PHAs. Prior to his academic career, he
served as Associate General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development and, before that, as Deputy Attorney General of the State of California. He is the
author of numerous articles and is a co-author of HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
3d ed. (Carolina Academic Press 1999) and LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, 2d ed. (Lexis
Publishing 1993) (3d ed. forthcoming 2000).
1. H.R. 4194, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); Pub. L. No. 105-276.
2. H.R. 4194, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998), 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq., Title V, PUBLIC
HOUSING AND TENANT-BASED ASSISTANCE REFORM, §§ 501-599H. That Act also appropriates
funds each fiscal year for other federal agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), and other independent agencies.
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policy that had been under consideration in Congress for several
years.3
In enacting QHWRA Congress announced that, “The bill . . .
deregulates the operation of public housing authorities . . . and gives
more power and flexibility to local governments and communities to
operate housing programs.”4 The Committee Report points out that,
“[I]t is the policy of the United States to assist States and political
subdivisions of States to remedy unsafe housing conditions and
housing shortages and to vest in public housing agencies [PHAs] the
maximum amount of responsibility and flexibility in program
administration. . ..”5
What exactly is the “maximum amount of responsibility and
flexibility” appropriate for local governments to exercise over
operation and utilization of the federally funded public housing
program appears to be substantially influenced by whether one is
viewing the issue from federal or local policy perspectives. That
question lies at the heart of the evaluation undertaken in this analysis.
3. This legislative path, however, involved congressional committees involved in
funding decisions rather than in developing housing policy. As a result, the congressional
committees that normally are involved in fashioning federal housing policy were not directly
involved in fashioning the final version. The legislation had initially been touted as one of the
more significant revisions of federal legislative policy concerning housing in decades by Rick
Lazio (R. NY), chairman of the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity of the
House Banking and Financial Services Committee. His draft contained a number of provisions
that would have made fundamental changes requiring HUD to delegate most of the
responsibility for administration of public housing to PHAs and would have eliminated
statutory authority for HUD’s current regulations requiring the Department to go through and
review all its public housing regulations and re-issue them individually. If one tracks the
various versions of the legislation, however, it appears that the final version of Title V was
significantly moderated from the more drastic changes advocated in the earlier versions with
regard to transferring most of the responsibility for administration of public housing to local
governments and PHAs. In many ways, the final legislation resembles HUD’s own version of
its restructuring of public housing that continued HUD’s authority to dictate much of what
PHAs must do in administering this program.
4.  Committee Report (emphasis added). As stated in H.R. 4194, § 502(b)(1) and (2) as
to the Act’s objectives of “deregulating and decontrolling public housing agencies, thereby
enabling them to perform as property and asset managers . . . [and] providing for more flexible
use of Federal assistance to public housing agencies. . ..”
5.  Committee Report (emphasis added). As stated in H.R. 4194, § 501(a)(5)(C),
interests of low-income persons, and the public interest will best be served by a reformed public
housing program that “vests in public housing agencies that perform well the maximum feasible
authority, discretion, and control with appropriate accountability to public housing residents,
localities, and the general public. . ..”
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This issue has been a source of tension almost from the beginning,
arising within a short time after enactment of this housing program in
1937.
During the last three decades, public housing has taken on an
increasingly pejorative image following its initial conception as a
bright hope for improving housing conditions for many lower-income
citizens. Earlier viewed as affordable, safe, and secure housing for
the working poor, access to which many lower middle-class families
aspired, over the years it began to accumulate a tawdry reputation as
a slum that consisted of racially segregated concentrations of the
poorest in society forced to live in deteriorating high-rise projects that
had literally become cesspools of crime and drug activity. Federal
policies enacted in the early 1980s pressed public housing into use as
housing of last resort, not only for the displaced but also for the
homeless, increased its stigma, making it an unacceptable option for
most— except for the few with no other choices.
Its operation, especially in large cities with high-rise family
developments containing concentrations of families and individuals
with social problems, became more and more problematic.6 Charges
of patronage permeated assessments of management capability.
Corruption was revealed in improper payments for construction and
maintenance work, shakedowns of contractors, and the basis on
which units were allocated to eligible tenants. These problems, and in
some cases the actuality of bribes, shoddy construction, and
inadequate maintenance, further reduced its attractiveness and
discouraged anyone interested in public housing as a management
career option except those dedicated to reversing these trends.
In the last fifteen years in order to protect the reputation of the
predominant number of PHAs successfully operating their programs,
HUD decided it needed to impose some measuring devices on PHA
management, to focus on “troubled” PHAs and assertively to
deregulate well-performing agencies. A series of federal assessment
systems to evaluate and rank competency in handling various
management functions evolved over time. These numerical
characterizations were used to classify PHAs and to justify federal
6. See H.R. 4194, § 502(a)(3).
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intervention to safeguard the appropriate use of the federal funds
involved. In that respect, an Inspector General Office, reorganized
with broader powers, was utilized to increase investigations of fraud,
waste, and abuse, identify the most egregious examples of local
misfeasance, and obtain repayment of ineligible and improper use of
funds.
Certainly by the mid-1990s, drastic measures were seen as
necessary to halt the downward spiral of this now fully stigmatized
portion of the housing stock. Many perceived it would only be
through fundamental changes in operations, management, and tenant
populations that these conditions could be reversed and the units
could once again provide attractive shelter opportunities for the
working poor and lower middle-class for whom these programs were
originally intended. The leaden hand of an entrenched and
paternalistic federal bureaucracy, moreover, imposing anachronistic
requirements that left little opportunity for local discretion in dealing
with stubborn local problems, was also seen by many in local
governments and in Congress as a major source of the problem.7
HUD had gained the reputation as an agency that could barely justify
its continued existence.
In this context, it was not surprising that major initiatives were
being proposed in Congress to change the program elements and
administrative approaches that had spawned these problems and to
attack the culture of poverty and crime that had become public
housing’s hallmark. The Clinton Administration also had been
addressing some of the perceived problems of high-rise
concentrations of socially problematic residents by encouraging
spectacular demolitions of older projects and their replacement by
mixed-income and mixed-financed developments that were cheaper
to maintain. The demolitions reduced density and scattered
concentrations of residents to other sites. Attacks on criminal
activities by public housing residents were also increased through
accelerated termination of tenancies and holding parents responsible
for their children’s criminal acts. Imposition of “One Strike And
7. See H.R. 4194, § 502(a)(4), “the federal method of overseeing every aspect of public
housing by detailed and complex statutes and regulations has aggravated the problem and has
placed excessive administrative burdens on public housing agencies. . ..”
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You’re Out” policies helped eliminate some of the worst offenders in
existing projects.
Thus, Congress, the Clinton Administration, and industry trade
groups had all been searching for alternative strategies to deal with a
deeply flawed federal housing program. Out of this reassessment of
the public housing program, one of the main strategies being
considered was releasing local governments from the overly
routinized requirements being imposed by federal administrators.
Perhaps, local administrators left to deal with these problems and
then held responsible for the results could make greater headway than
the bifurcated federal-local system that made both inept and absolved
each of ultimate responsibility for conditions that had occurred. The
potential for a major devolution in responsibility by the federal to
local governments seemed to be an integral part of earlier versions of
the legislation that were developed by the Housing and Community
Opportunity Subcommittee of the House of Representatives8 that
started in earnest to revise public housing requirements in 1996 with
the political changeover of that body.
In considering the reality of the devolution to local governments
that Congress trumpeted in enacting the 1998 Act, however, one must
be ever mindful of the old saying that he who supplies the money is
ultimately likely to call the tune. The following discussion first
touches on some of the changes made in the federal housing
programs affected by this legislation and then assesses the extent to
which federal devolution of responsibility to local governments for
administration of public housing has actually occurred. Several
processes Congress mandated in the 1998 Act requiring federal-local
government interaction are also considered as indicators of the extent
to which federal government dead-hand control is likely to continue:
the negotiated rulemaking on critical decisions in allocating public
housing funds, and the manner in which HUD implemented the local
planning requirements mandated under the 1998 Act.
It is hard not to conclude that while such previously federally
mandated matters as tenant eligibility, admissions policy, income
calculations, tenant preferences, waiting lists, pet ownership, and
8.  This is a subcommittee of the House Banking and Financial Services Committee.
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rents charged can theoretically now be determined locally, the federal
government rather than local governments still exercises fundamental
control over administration of the public housing program. Local
discretion continues to be substantially restricted. There may be some
valid policy reasons for continued federal restrictions on local
actions, but the issue is whether the controls on local administration
go too far. This continuing federal power is exercised through a
number of specific provisions in the legislation that provide the focus
for this examination of what continues to be an over riding federal
control of operation of public housing by local governments. Then,
HUD’s own implementing regulations have had their own impact by
substantially retarding in some instances Congress’ intent to expand
PHA flexibility.
A. The Public Housing Landscape
Under the 1998 Act PHAs continue to be authorized to administer
public housing programs on the local level, both in existing
government-owned, operated, and funded public housing structures
(the traditional public housing model) and also in units rented by
tenants from private landlords with financial assistance supported
with federal funds provided by PHAs. Federal funds provide a
substantial portion of the private rentals paid by eligible tenants. A
portion of a reasonable rent is paid by the PHA to the landlord and
tenants also make a contribution to the landlord towards their rent
computed as an applicable percentage of their household income. The
latter program is inelegantly referred to as the Section 8 Existing
Housing Program.9
These federally financed public housing programs provide
housing for roughly three million low- and moderate-income
families. The issue of whether public housing policy will be
determined and administered federally, top down, or locally, bottom
up, is one of fundamental importance in a federal system. In many
ways, the federal-local tensions inherent in the relationship between
levels of government that has been fashioned for the public housing
system in the United States lie at the heart of the difficulties that over
9.  United States Housing Act of 1937 § 8(o), 42 U.S.C. 1437f(o).
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time often have been experienced in local operation of these federally
funded housing programs. Obtaining continued funding for the
program is dependent upon responsible administration of the
program, which, in turn, requires some reasonable level of flexibility
in local administration.
1. Horizontal Distribution of Access to Public Housing
In the United States, public housing serves only a portion of those
eligible, for example, roughly 17%, about 3.9 million households, out
of some 23.2 million in the 1990s who were classified as low income.
This federally financed, locally managed government (not private)
housing stock has been estimated to be worth over 90 billion
dollars.10
2. Local Government Administration of Low-Rent Public
Housing Units11
Currently there are approximately 3,900 PHAs that manage this
federally funded housing. Of these, 3,300 manage 1,345,000 housing
units initially financed by federal construction subsidies and
supported by continuing federal operating and capital funding for
rehabilitation (formerly “modernization” grants) under the federal
Low Rent Public Housing Program. Federal subsidies are necessary
to cover most of the costs of operating and maintaining the dwelling
units since rental income from the very low-income residents in these
units is limited and, in any event, cannot exceed thirty percent of
household adjusted annual income under applicable federal
requirements.
PHAs are authorized under state laws and can be created by local
governments, primarily municipalities (but including some counties),
to carry out government housing functions in the locality. Most PHAs
are small. Roughly 2,900 PHAs operate less than 500 housing units.
10. H.R. 4194, § 502(a)(2). This figure is clearly for replacement value since many of the
high-rise projects would be unlikely to have significant value given their neighborhood
locations, conditions of the buildings, and characteristics of the tenant populations.
11.  The source of these statistics come from publications of the National Association of
Housing and Redevelopment Officials.
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An additional 400 PHAs administer between 500 and 3,000 units.
The top eleven largest PHAs handle in excess of 10,000 units each.
The New York City Housing Authority, by itself, manages over
156,000 units.
3. Elements of the Section 8 Program Using Private Rental
Properties
In addition to the Low Rent Housing Program, PHAs also
administer federal funds provided through a program called Section
8, named after the section of the Housing Act that created it. This
program provides for payment of federal subsidies to cover market
rents (in addition to tenant contributions) to private landlords whose
units are rented to eligible tenants through PHAs. Tenants are not
allowed to pay more than forty percent of their adjusted annual
household income initially for their rent contribution. Thereafter,
market demands may require even higher percentages so long as
tenants remain in place. Another 2,100 PHAs manage 1,520,000 units
under this Section 8 program.
4. Public Housing Funding Levels
Annual federal outlays over the last few years starting in fiscal
year 1999 have been roughly $2.8 billion for operating subsidies and
$3 billion for capital expenditures; the figures were $3.1 billion and
$2.9 billion respectively for fiscal year 2000. In 2001 the proposed
amounts are currently $3.1 billion and $2.8 billion.12 Amounts for
Section 8 certificates covering the merged programs proposed for
fiscal year 2001 are roughly $15 billion for rental payments to private
landlords, some of it recaptured from prior year allocations.13
5. Public Housing Tenant Profiles
Current public housing resident profiles are of households in the
bottom twenty percent of their community in income. Nationally, the
12. NAHRO MONITOR, May 31, 2000, Vol. XXII, No. 10, at 1-2.
13. NAHRO MONITOR, May 31, 2000, Vol. XXII, No. 10, at 1-2. This was an increase of
almost $5 billion over last year’s appropriations.
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average income is roughly $7,300 annually, about half of the poverty
level income. Families wait an average, of 13 months on PHA
waiting lists for units. The length of residence in public housing is
between 6 and 7 years on average, somewhat more than the generally
applicable 5 year tenure in the general population before residents
move. The average rent is about $135 per month, representing 22%
of the average public housing tenant household’s income. Of total
tenants, family households with children make up about 50%. Of
these families, 73% are female headed and 78% are non-white. The
other tenants are elderly (30%), and disabled (18%). Tenant rent
contributions in the United States of 30% are high compared with
under 20% that households average in many other countries in the
world, leaving less resources for other necessities.
6. Local Political Nature of PHAs
PHAs are creatures of local governments, either state, regional,
county, or municipal, even though their funding comes primarily
from the federal government. Most, but not all, are independent of
municipal governments, although many mayors in cities where state
law has created an independent authority are still given power to
appoint members of the Housing Commission that governs PHAs,
meaning that local political considerations may still be at play.
II. EVALUATING THE 1998 ACT’S LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Almost all of the following items are likely to be inherent in the
design and management of a low rent public housing program. The
distribution of responsibility for these issues can be allocated either to
national or to local government depending upon the national
objectives for providing these funds and the competencies and
weaknesses of each that in a perfect world should determine which
functions each should perform. In evaluating the following items,
consideration should be given to the competencies and values that
each level of government exercises. Then, one can better evaluate the
significance of the devolution that Congress intended and
subsequently that HUD actually put in place and what values provide
the rationale for QHWRA’s handling of these items that were dealt
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with by specific provisions in it. The items below do not include all
the applicable provisions.
A. Tenant Interests Stressed
1. Tenant Participation Imposed
The 1998 Act requires that in most cases at least one recipient of
housing services must serve on the PHA Board of Commissioners, its
governing board. This makes mandatory what some state laws and
many PHAs have already done, i.e., include tenants on their Boards
of Commissioners. This federal provision obviously imposes a limit
on local administration and is binding on PHAs, limiting their
discretion. Whether it is justified if maximum feasible local
discretion is to be observed is the question. Ironically, however, in
the past in some instances where HUD has acted to take over poorly
performing PHAs, sometimes the first casualties are the tenants
serving on the Board of Commissioners when HUD dismisses the
Board and replaces them with a receiver, frequently a private
contractor totally directed by HUD staff.
As discussed below, under requirements for a planning process
that the 1998 Act imposed on PHAs, tenants now are also given an
opportunity to respond to the five year and annual agency plans that
PHAs must generate, which are subject to final HUD approval.
Consideration of tenant concerns is only part of HUD’s evaluation of
the PHAs planning efforts. While HUD is often sensitive to resident
interests, this should not imply that this means tenant concerns are
paramount. Rather, physical inspections to determine conditions of
units, fiscal responsibility exercised, and successful management
operations, all as defined by HUD, are the primary consideration in
the PHA’s performance according to HUD’s assessment criteria.
Thus, while lip service is given to tenant interests and to
understanding of what may affect them, HUD views its role more as
a fiscal conservator of the bricks and mortar and proper use of federal
funds rather than protector of tenant rights.
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2. Tenant Rights to Pet Ownership
Under the 1998 Act PHAs are now required to give tenants the
right to own and house in their own unit one or more common
household pets, subject to reasonable requirements as published by
the PHA and consistent with federal, state, and local laws and
regulations. Previously, PHAs were not required to permit tenants to
have pets, except in the case of the elderly and disabled who have
enjoyed this right for well over a decade. So, Congress has decided
that pets are of sufficient stature in the scope of things that all tenants
have an absolute right to at least the common variety of them. Again,
federal rights dictate local administration requirements. Probably, this
is because pet ownership has been over the last several decades one
of the most controversial rights of tenants. It has generated some of
the most lively debate over management practices.
3. Families May Choose Either to Pay a Flat Unit Rent or a Rent
Limited to Thirty Percent of Their Income
Families in public housing are now entitled to decide whether they
would rather pay a reasonable flat rent for their unit set by the PHA
or limit their rent payments to up to thirty percent of household
income, a percentage applied uniformly by the PHA.14 Previously,
tenants with higher incomes might have had to pay even more than
the market rent for their unit. This provision permitting PHAs to set a
flat rent was intended by the 1998 Act to remove previously existing
federally imposed disincentives for families who gain employment
and achieve self-sufficiency to remain in public housing and serve as
role models. Tenants can choose the least expense rent option.
This approach provides PHAs greater flexibility in maintaining
income protection for tenants while permitting families whose
income is starting to rise from having to pay, as they have been
required to in the past, a larger rental if thirty percent of their income
were the only basis for setting rents. Congress’ objective was to make
14.  PHAs are to set “flat rent” based on fair market rents computed by HUD for each
county, but these can be adjusted for various factors based on a reasonable rent in the specific
circumstances test.
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it easier financially for such tenants to remain in their public housing
units, if they desired to do so. PHAs want to retain such tenants in
their public housing complexes to provide greater stability, to act as
role models, and to achieve a better income mix that can help
generate more revenues than if higher income tenants move out and
poorer tenants replace them. HUD regulations, however, do not allow
PHAs to be reimbursed for flexible treatment of flat rents, somewhat
inhibiting PHA flexibility.
4. Income of Welfare Recipients Who Become Employed
Disregarded in Calculating Rent for Two Years
Any additional income generated by a former welfare recipient
who goes back to work is ignored for twelve months in determining
rent payments. Up to fifty percent is ignored for a second year, giving
an incentive for them to seek work.
5. Tenants Permitted to Take Over Management Functions
Residents or non-profit resident management corporations are
authorized to assume management responsibilities for their own
projects. PHAs are authorized to contract with resident management
corporations to manage individual projects. Experimental efforts in
this regard started more than a decade ago, but it was not always easy
for tenants to do so. First, HUD generally was skeptical of tenant
capabilities so only a few management corporations actually
succeeded in taking on such functions. Because PHA administrators
often resist such incursions into their scope of authority, Congress
has tried to provide a firmer basis for such tenant initiatives. In the
end, the decision of whether or not to contract with tenants to carry
out these functions is left to the PHA administrators, so that this
federal authority for tenants to undertake such functions is not likely
to be exercised very often. Not surprisingly, HUD seems rarely to
have supported these efforts in any serious fashion in the past after
the concept was championed by former Secretary of HUD, Jack
Kemp, in the prior administration.
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6. Minimum Rents of Up to Fifty Dollars Must Be Charged by
PHAs
Congress directed that HUD require PHAs to charge at least a
minimum rent of up to fifty dollars monthly to each resident
household, regardless of income. The PHA determines the amount
from zero dollars to fifty dollars. Hardship waivers are also provided
for, however, subject to federal oversight. This minimal fee is
equivalent in principle to the twenty-five dollars to fifty dollars
minimum monthly rentals imposed by prior congressional legislation.
Apparently an effort to satisfy fiscal conservatives in Congress, i.e.,
there should be no free lunch, HUD’s proposed implementing
regulations have been criticized as confusing for tenants. This is
another federally mandated restriction on local government
discretion.
7. Income Increases from New Employment Excluded for
Twelve Months
In order to encourage tenants to seek employment, Congress does
not allow a PHA to calculate for purposes of setting rents any income
from new employment for twelve months (so long as the period
without employment exceeded four months). Further, only fifty
percent of that income can be counted during the following year.
Many PHAs actually find this relaxation of previous rigid federal
standards on how rents must be calculated a refreshing change. Of
course, in another sense, it is yet another mandate limiting PHA
discretion. In addition, no adjustments for subsidy levels are provided
to compensate PHAs for this consideration.
B. Flexibility for PHAs in Administration and Use of Funds
1. Flexibility Provided in Use of Capital Funds
Starting in fiscal year 2000, PHAs with more than 250 units will
be able to use up to twenty percent of their capital grants for
construction and modernization for operational expenses instead.
PHAs with less than 250 units can use all of their capital funds for
operations. Also, receipt of other income by PHAs generated, for
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instance from investment earnings, will no longer decrease amounts
available from the federal government that can be expended on
operational costs. In the past, PHAs were penalized for such activities
by loss of equivalent federal funds. Further, some demolition costs
and remediation of environmental hazards as well as the amount of
other non-federal funds used for construction will no longer count
against calculation of cost caps for development that can limit the
quality of construction and add to maintenance costs. This change
was clearly an effort to free up the entrepreneurial spirit of PHAs and
give local governments more leeway in handling their programs.
2. HUD Defines Adjusted Tenant Income for Rent Calculations
HUD is still authorized to set mandatory exclusions in
determining tenant income, such as four hundred dollars for
dependents, the costs of medical expenses especially for elderly and
disabled persons, child care, a monetary allowance for minors in the
household, along with exclusion of certain child support payments,
spousal support payments, and earned income of minors. PHAs are
provided limited authority to provide for other exclusions but with no
increase in subsidy to support the decreased PHA income. Here,
Congress has clearly limited local discretion, at least in imposing
financial burdens on tenants. Consistency values prevail as does
consideration of the impact on tenant income for other purposes.
3. PHAs Must Submit Acceptable Agency Plans
PHAs must provide HUD with a five-year plan and annual plans
reflecting:
a. Information on the housing needs of the locality;
b. Population served;
c. Method of rent determination;
d. Operational procedures;
e. Capital improvements needed;
f. Unmet housing needs of eligible local families;
g. Homeownership programs; and
h. Efforts to coordinate housing programs with welfare agencies.
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Resident Advisory Boards must be established and plans must be
developed in consultation with the Advisory Board members. If
PHAs and HUD take the process seriously, the work by PHAs can be
extremely useful in helping formulate realistic local policies. Early
indications, however, are that HUD, by only requiring adherence to a
rather simplistic template in satisfying HUD review, does not intend
to require that PHAs make realistic efforts to carry out their planning
functions.15 One further problem with the template is that it provides
a vehicle to impose further restrictions on PHA actions. For example,
HUD has imposed a customer satisfaction practices survey
incorporating other requirements from the controversial assessment
system HUD has designed to rate PHAs. The process HUD has
created forces PHAs back to HUD staff for clarification and
approvals giving HUD the opportunity to impose its versions of what
a PHA should do in running its program. Possibly HUD’s approach is
its anticipated inability to perform its review of the PHA plans within
the mandatory seventy-five day period mandated by the statute. By
only asking PHAs simply to check off alternative boxes rather than
go through any process, HUD has demonstrated that it does not take
these congressionally mandated requirements seriously. Thus, PHAs
will not be required to effectively evaluate their local conditions or
plan effectively for the future. In essence, this means local planning
is likely to be formalistic and not real. Nor will a thorough factual
grounding for local decisions be developed. Essentially HUD has
nullified the federally mandated action, lowering any hurdles PHAs
might otherwise have had to navigate.
15.  A major change made by QHWRA is the requirement for all housing authorities to
develop an Agency Plan. HUD was given responsibility to set forth the details and format. In
fulfilling its responsibilities, HUD seems to have “dumbed down” the process by only asking a
check off by PHAs to fill out their planning documents in the electronic template HUD has
provided. HUD has taken away much if not all creativity that might have been required of a
PHA to carry out the planning. The result is a “one size fits all” approach. Two examples are
illustrative. For instance, HUD’s template allows PHAs in developing a mission statement to
adopt a generalized statement HUD has developed in lieu of the PHA fashioning its own
statement. HUD has also provided its own versions of a PHA’s goals and objectives that the
PHA can adopt as their own rather than going through the important process of thinking
through what they want to accomplish. HUD seems more interested in simplifying their own
review process and data gathering rather than respecting the devolution thrust of the legislation.
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4. PHAs to Set Up Eight-Hour Monthly Tenant Community
Work Programs
In keeping with Congress’ mandate that able-bodied, non-elderly
adults who are not working or in a training program (and thus have
minimal income) must make a contribution towards rent in the form
of contributed services to the community, PHAs are to set forth how
this obligation will be implemented and monitored. The condition
was bitterly debated in Congress and illustrates that while federal
requirements will be imposed on PHAs, HUD appears to be willing
to allow PHAs to formulate flexible options to meet the congressional
requirements.
5. Mandated Income Targeting
PHA economic viability and flexibility are significantly restricted
by Congress’ requirement that PHAs cannot fill more than 60% of
their Low Rent Public Housing units with families whose incomes
exceed 30% of area median income (AMI). The other 40% would
have to be “very low income tenants.” Concepts of income mixing
and greater fiscal stability for PHAs that might like to attract higher
income tenants have been sublimated to ensuring a federal objective
that a significant portion of public housing units will still be reserved
for the poorest families. Thus, tenants with incomes of up to 80% of
AMI (considered “low income tenants”) can be accommodated so
long as they do not constitute more than 60% of the new admissions.
By limiting those with higher incomes to “new admissions,”
Congress further restricted PHA flexibility in determining the
populations they will serve. Existing tenants will be protected.
For the first time, however, admission requirements will differ
between Section 8 and the traditional Low Rent Public Housing
programs. In the case of Section 8 units, 75% of vouchers to tenants
are to be reserved for those whose incomes do not exceed 30% of
AMI, unless certain special circumstances apply. This means that
federal requirements will be imposed on PHAs to require them to
continue to provide for a substantial number of the poorest families in
certain existing developments, but an even larger percentage of
scattered site units must still be reserved for poorer families.
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Local handling of admissions, therefore, still is subject to rather
explicit federal requirements rather than allowing PHAs to think
through admission policies and try to encourage income-mixing of
residents. Moreover, all PHA admission policies continue to be
subject to HUD review, a process that will leave significant potential
for further federal dictation of admissions, as has been the case
during much of the existence of the Low Rent Public Housing
program. PHAs, however, are now fully authorized to offer
incentives and priority to attract public safety officers who would be
willing to move into and reside in units in public housing projects.
6. PHAs May Mortgage Their Properties Subject to HUD
Approval
So long as no liability would be created for HUD, PHAs are given
more flexibility in raising funds for new development. Such
mortgages of existing properties could be used to generate funds for
operating costs, to facilitate ultimate sale of units to residents, or to
support new developments. This change distinctly improves PHA
flexibility, but, of course, why should HUD care if its fiscal position
is not directly effected. It will take effect only after federal
regulations, yet to be proposed, are issued.
7. Federal Preferences for Tenants Repealed
While federal requirements that preference be given to persons
living in substandard housing, paying more than fifty percent of
income towards rent or who have been involuntarily displaced, were
suspended by Congress during the last several years, all such federal
preferences for admission have now been repealed under the 1998
Act. These federal requirements created a large influx of non-elderly
disabled persons into projects for the elderly, causing considerable
disruption for the remaining elderly tenants. These preferences were
also a factor in lowering median income levels in the projects, putting
some PHAs in a fiscal bind. PHAs can now determine whether they
want to impose their own preferences. Section 8 owners from whom
PHAs rent or provide vouchers for eligible tenants can also for the
first time give preference to renting to employed persons.
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In a recently published proposed rule on deconcentrating public
housing, however, HUD seems intent on using its regulatory power to
create new federal preferences by regulation. Applicants that fit
criteria HUD prescribes will be exempted from the deconcentration
requirements.16
8. Permanent Lease Provisions Repealed
The “endless leases” that HUD previously mandated PHAs use in
the Section 8 program required cause for termination. Now leases can
have a finite term and private owners can decline to renew a lease
without regard to statutory causes for termination. These changes
provide additional flexibility to PHAs in administering their
programs. Tenants are to receive prior notice of termination of their
rentals.
9. Requirements to “Take One Tenant Take All” Repealed
Provisions that had required owners of multifamily projects who
leased a unit to one Section 8 voucher holder to accept all other
eligible voucher holders who may apply to that project or any other
property of the owner have been repealed. Obviously, such a
provision discouraged owners from participating in the Section 8
program. This allows PHAs greater opportunities to place their
tenants based on valid bases for landlords to select among tenants. Of
course, racial or other prohibited discrimination cannot constitute
such grounds.
10. Owners Must Consent in Advance to Law Enforcement
Searches
If police have probable cause to believe criminal activity is
occurring in common areas of a development, the owner is required
as a condition of leasing units to federally supported tenants to give
prior consent to searches by police. Another illustration of federal
16.  The proposed regulation was published in the April 17, 2000 Federal Register, at vol.
65, No. 74, 20685-95. The final rule was issued on August 14, 2000 at vol. 65, No. 157, 49484-
85.
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reluctance to allow such decisions to be made by local governments
rather than mandated top down.
11. Drug or Alcohol Dependence Not a Disability for Rental
Preferences
Congress restricted drug or alcohol dependence as grounds for
disability for admission preference purposes. What had been a
restriction on local discretion is thus removed.
12. Owners of Section 8 Units and PHAs May Not Admit
Registered Sex Offenders But Can Deny or Delay Admission
of any Person Committing a Crime
If a crime has been committed by an applicant within a reasonable
time of their request for admission, an owner may deny or at least
delay admission if the crime would adversely affect the health or
safety of other tenants or management. Such flexibility for private
sector landlords can allow PHAs greater opportunities to place
eligible tenants. Similarly, drug-related criminal activity can
constitute grounds for eviction and disqualifies a tenant from re-
admission for at least three years. The restriction on renting to sex
offenders and allowing owners to reject tenants on the basis of
commission of a crime actually increases owner flexibility and
provides more discretion than in the past.
These requirements have been expanded by HUD regulations that
force PHAs to evict current tenants who are on state “Megan Law”
registers.
13. Occupancy of No More than Two Persons per Bedroom
This occupancy standard is made presumptively reasonable so as
to avoid Fair Housing Act challenges, but the standard is subject to
rebuttal on specific circumstances, such as, age of children and the
capacity of building systems. HUD is prohibited from establishing
any other national occupancy standard. This provision provides
greater flexibility while clarifying a standard that was previously
subject to a good deal of confusion.
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14. PHAs Given Flexibility to Establish Site-Based Tenant
Waiting Lists
Over the last several decades, HUD has required PHAs to
maintain community-wide rather than specific project waiting lists. In
areas where considerable racial segregation has occurred in certain
projects, applicants were likely to have to go to the project with the
most vacancies or were forced to integrate other segregated projects
rather than taking a unit of their choice. The realities were that
eligible applicants on the waiting list would choose to go back to the
end of the line rather than have to move to a specific project they did
not want to reside in. This Congressional change allows PHAs more
flexibility in allocating units according to tenant preferences. Civil
rights goals were probably not being achieved by the prior procedures
anyway. Rather the process simply delayed most tenants from
obtaining shelter other than in a disfavored project. HUD’s
regulations, however, appear to be resisting this flexibility by making
approvals of site based waiting lists more onerous than community-
wide lists.
15. Merger of Duplicative Housing Certificate and Voucher
Programs
The prior Section 8 certificate and voucher programs, which had a
historical basis but no justification for different procedures, were
merged by the 1998 Act. The PHA may set local preferences for
private landlords participating in the program based upon housing
needs and priorities, but owners will be responsible for screening and
selection of tenants within such parameters. PHAs may terminate
contracts for rentals with owners who fail to evict disruptive tenants.
These provisions extend PHA flexibility.
16. Administrative Fees Set for PHA Management of Section 8
Rentals
Previously, 7% of the grant amount was set aside and provided to
the PHA for administering the Section 8 program. The 1998 Act
increased this slightly to about 7.65%, even though private owners
will be more involved in finding and approving tenants, relieving
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PHAs of much of that burden. These funds can be used flexibly by
PHAs, so this provision provides slightly more funds and enhances
local discretion in their use.
17. Mixed Finance Projects Authorized
In order to facilitate greater income mix in projects, PHAs may
now finance projects with private entities while utilizing federal
public housing funds in the same project. Projects can, thus, include
both market rate and public housing eligible tenants in these units.
Investment may include loans, grants, guarantees, or other forms of
investment. Another step in increasing local flexibility in
administration.
18. Home Rule Demonstration
While HUD powers to deal with substandard-performing PHAs
were increased, local governments can now ask HUD for home rule
flexibility options to take over management of public housing within
their jurisdiction. Obviously such an option for local governments is
quite threatening to all but high-performing PHAs. The threat,
however, was largely blunted by giving HUD authority to decide
which, if any, underperforming PHAs would be subject to such action
and whether to anoint the local government to act on behalf of the
PHA. The demonstration would only be available for up to one
hundred jurisdictions. PHAs, being mostly independent of municipal
governments, were strongly opposed to throwing them more directly
into the local political tempest.
Since HUD would enter into the performance agreements with
local governments, some claim this would increase the potential for
local politicization of public housing management as a source of
patronage. However, most local governments are unlikely to use this
opportunity given the significant road blocks HUD could impose
were any mayor so reckless as to undertake such a project where
others had failed miserably. Flexibility without real meaning could be
one comment on this provision, earlier an extremely controversial
one.
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C. Federal-Local Government Impacts of Consolidation of
Categorical Grants into Block Grant Funds
A number of individual categorical grant programs, such as
modernization and comprehensive grants, were merged under the
1998 Act into two funds: Operating and Capital. In turn, allocation of
the funds was subject to a Negotiated Rulemaking process discussed
below. Congress also mandated that formulas for allocation include a
factor to reward superior performance by PHAs based on HUD’s
Public Housing Assessment System performance assessments. The
consolidation itself allows HUD to concentrate on fewer pots of
funds, making the federal controls and restrictions potentially more
significant. However, as discussed below, the actual impact on PHAs
was relatively responsibly dealt with by participants during the “Neg-
Reg” process itself. The only risk is that the specific amounts
previously appropriated to each of the individual funds now
consolidated could be more easily reduced when only one amount
needs to be cut. This actually occurred in the case of the Operating
Funds for fiscal year 2000, thereby partly frustrating the interim
negotiated consensus PHAs had reached with HUD.17
1. The Consolidated Funds
a. The Operating Fund
The amount of funds for 2000, as noted above, was $3.1 billion.
In future years, it will be “such sums as may be appropriated
annually.” The issues for the rulemaking were on what basis will the
funds be distributed as between PHAs and based on what criteria.
b. The Capital Fund
This fund is used for construction and modernization of units.
Again, its allocation was the subject of a negotiated rulemaking
between HUD and local government PHAs. The amount for 1999
was $2.9 billion and thereafter will be “such sums as may be
17.  See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
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appropriated annually.” Given that finite amounts are involved in
both instances, i.e., the amount of the appropriation for a given fiscal
year, it would appear to be in HUD’s benefit for a variety of reasons
that local government recipients develop agreements among
themselves on the basis for the allocation, unless obvious unfairness
occurs requiring HUD’s intervention.
2. The HUD-Local Government Negotiated Rulemaking
Experience
QHWRA mandated that HUD develop three implementing rules
using the negotiated rulemaking process. This “Neg-Reg” process has
been used successfully for years by some federal agencies; however,
HUD has shown relatively little interest in it.
a. HUD’s Initial Experience in Two Earlier Neg-Regs Had
Been Positive
Following Congress’ instructions HUD’s first negotiated
rulemaking took place in 1995. It involved the theretofore
controversial “Vacancy Rule” that governs how vacant units would
be counted for generating public housing operating subsidy funds to
be allocated to PHAs for purposes of distributing appropriated funds
under HUD’s Performance Funding System (PFS) regulations (24
CFR Part 990). Congress had provided that no changes could be
made to the PFS regulations, except through such a negotiated
rulemaking process. To the astonishment of many at HUD and those
in PHAs as well, the rule was cooperatively negotiated and drafted
within a few days. The proposed rule that resulted generated almost
no public criticism.
Despite the relative ease of that process, HUD’s second effort to
utilize Neg-Reg procedures also occurred only after statutory
direction to do so. This process involved a much broader and more
complex subject matter: implementation of the Native American
Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996
(NAHASDA). This rulemaking, reflecting the inherently difficult
nature of the task and the not always happy relationship between
HUD and Indian tribes, was arduous but nonetheless was ultimately
viewed by participants as successful.
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b. The QHWRA Neg-Regs
Congress required three separate Neg-Regs by HUD in the 1998
QHWRA legislation. All involve the development of a formula for
allocation of HUD funding to PHAs. The first required determining
use of funds for renewals of Section 8 Annual Contributions
Contracts between PHAs and private sector providers of tenant-based
rental assistance. The second and third were to determine the
distribution of funding to PHAs from newly created Public Housing
Operating and Capital Funds created by Section 519 of the QHWRA.
The first sets out how federal funds will be allocated by deciding
what operating expenses for PHAs will qualify and in what amounts
This decision directly affects individual PHA current budgets and
operations. The second negotiation determines general standards that
will result in allocations of available funds to individual PHAs for
construction and rehabilitation projects.
Final action from these rulemakings was not expected to be
completed until late Spring 2000.18 Some observers have commented
that the success of each of the committees appointed to participate in
the Neg-Reg has varied widely. The negotiation process of the
Section 8 funding allocation rule was the least difficult. The
Operating Fund Rule was the most problematical. To the extent such
a perception is accurate, it may reflect, like the earlier Native
American negotiations, the complexity of the subject matter. It is also
true that the Operating Fund Neg-Reg got off to a rocky start.
18. An interim rule was not expected to be published until late Spring. The Operating
Fund Neg-Reg, while reaching an interim consensus, clearly needed more accurate data then
currently available regarding a number of integral considerations in devising a distribution
formula that would make sense to all PHAs. A study was proposed by an outside institution.
The actual expense levels vary considerably among PHAs, depending upon size. In particular,
PHAs with five hundred or less units tend to have relatively low expenses, especially compared
to larger ones in urban centers with concentrations of residents with aggravated social
problems. Costs for resident participation, which can be sizeable in many PHAs, was to be
included in budget requests to Congress by HUD, although because of the timing of the
agreement, it came late in the budget cycle for that year and was not included in the 2001
budget request. See NAHRO MONITOR, Dec. 15, 1999, Vol. XXI, No. 23 at 1-2.
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c. Issues Arising out of the Operating Fund Neg-Reg
Shortly before the commencement of this Neg-Reg, three industry
groups that were to participate on the Neg-Reg Committee
representing PHAs filed suit against HUD on an unrelated matter in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The
organizations claimed that in issuing a separate rule used for
assessing performance of PHAs, HUD had not followed proper
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) rulemaking procedures.
HUD’s issuance of its new assessment system, the Public Housing
Assessment System (PHAS) with a shortened notice and comment
period, was seen by PHAs as unfairly vague, allowing HUD to apply
undisclosed criteria by which they would be judged. The suit asked
for temporary relief, alleging in general that the notice and comment
provisions of the APA and HUD’s own “Rule on Rules” had not been
complied with and that the rule itself was insufficiently detailed to
provide adequate guidance to PHAs.
HUD’s extrajudicial response to this challenge was to deliver a
letter “requesting” that representatives of the three plaintiffs
withdraw from the Neg-Reg Committee because of a conflict of
interest as a result of the pending PHAS litigation. The letter was
accompanied by verbal statements that HUD would have no choice
but to adjourn or terminate the Neg-Reg if representatives of the
plaintiff organizations continued to participate. While the suit
involved the PHAS assessment criteria, HUD claimed the conflict of
interest arose because the criteria might involve the same subject
matters dealt with in the operating fund negotiations. HUD reasoned
that since Congress required the operating fund formula to reflect
grantee performance and since performance would be measured by
the regimen contained in the PHAS rule, the three plaintiff
organizations could not properly participate in a negotiation process
involving a good faith effort to reach a consensus. The delivery of
HUD’s letter was bolstered by statements on the part of the
Facilitator of the Operating Fund Neg-Reg, expressing the legal
conclusion that HUD could terminate or adjourn the rulemaking any
time it wished.
Faced with scuttling the Neg-Reg process if they refused to do so,
the industry groups stepped aside, although since the proceedings
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were public they could not be prevented from at least attending. The
suit was subsequently settled and dismissed involving the PHAS rule.
The three industry organizations were then permitted to rejoin the
Neg-Reg proceedings without HUD objection.
This incident, in addition to consuming more than a day of the
committee’s time and poisoning the negotiating atmosphere, raised
important legal questions. Neg-Regs proceed simultaneously under
two statutes: the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 199019 and the
Federal Advisory Committee Act.20 The former, in section 565(a)(1),
provides that in establishing and administering a negotiated
rulemaking committee, a federal agency “shall comply with the
Federal Advisory Committee Act with respect to such committee,
except as otherwise provided in this subchapter.”
Section 10(e) of the FACA allows federal government
representatives on an advisory committee to adjourn any meeting if
they determine such action to be in the public interest. The FACA
also provides that no advisory committee meetings are to proceed
without the participation of federal government representatives. The
Neg-Reg Act, on the other hand, states in section 566(b) that the
federal government’s representative on a negotiated rulemaking
committee “shall participate in the deliberations and activities of the
committee with the same rights and responsibilities as other members
of the committee. . ..” Moreover, federal agencies are not permitted to
terminate a Neg-Reg committee before the completion of a rule or the
time provided in its charter without first “consulting” with the
committee.21 Neither Act says anything about removal from
committees.
A negotiated rulemaking committee is a special kind of federal
advisory committee— one in which the federal agency occupies a
position as a negotiating partner. Although the product of its labors
consists only of a “recommended” rule, the Neg-Reg Act provides
that a federal agency “to the maximum extent possible consistent
with [its] legal obligations, will use the consensus of the committee
as the basis for the rule proposed by the agency for notice and
19. Neg-Reg Act, 5 U.S.C. § 561 et seq.
20. FACA, 5 U.S.C. App.
21. Neg-Reg Act § 567.
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comment.” Moreover, where the negotiated rulemaking is mandated
by statute, that is a special kind of rulemaking. Whether federal
agencies possess the power to remove members or to adjourn or
terminate negotiated rulemaking proceedings without prior
consultation where such a Neg-Reg was specified by Congress
requires clarification for future proceedings using this mode of
rulemaking.
Another critical issue that arose out of the Operating Fund neg-reg
regarding distribution of federal financial assistance to PHAs for
operation and management of public housing was that the negotiating
committee determined that sufficient data did not exist on the actual
costs of operating PHAs to make some of the decisions necessary and
that a cost study should be performed. While an interim approach to
the distribution was formulated, a cost study was requested and a
subsequent line item appropriation in the 2000 appropriations bill by
Congress has authorized funding for the study by the Harvard
University Graduate School of Design.
In 1975 a performance funding system was developed that tried to
set allowable expense levels applicable to all PHAs, whether of the
size of New York City’s 150,000 plus units or of a small town thirty
unit PHA. Clearly one standard for expenditures required was not
workable. Due to be completed by the end of 2001, the study will
incorporate such considerations as PHA missions, applicable
standards in achieving such missions, the basis for comparisons
between PHAs, distinctions and differences in operating costs
between managing private and public housing, and issues of funding
methods.22
III. CONCLUSION
In simply looking at the number of mandatory elements of the
1998 Act as it pertained to PHAs, it should be apparent that
Congress, particularly the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees to whom the final decisions were left, felt obligated to
continue to impose federal mandates on a substantial portion of the
operation of public housing by PHAs. Of the some twenty-five items
22. See NAHRO MONITOR, Apr. 30, 2000, Vol. XXII, No. 8, at 7-8.
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in the 1998 Act dealing with administration of public housing
examined in this analysis, roughly half still involve federally-
imposed restrictions on how public housing should be managed by
PHAs. Clearly, a number of values other than maximum feasible
management flexibility for PHAs are at play.
Such considerations as tenant rights and involvement in
management and giving those on welfare incentives to work, are
some examples of other considerations Congress felt needed to be
incorporated. Similarly, a number of fiscal requirements that impact
on management decisions have also been continued. These are
understandable values.
A related issue is how HUD has implemented the applicable
provisions. While HUD was restricted in continuing to control PHA
management in a number of regards, early appraisals of how HUD
regulations and practices adopted after the 1998 Act have dealt with
PHAs suggest that paternalistic practices are creeping back into the
relationship between federal administrators and PHAs.23 Some
opportunities have been lost, as well. The potential for stimulating
much more thoughtful planning by PHAs with respect to their
particular goals, objectives, and conditions, at least at the onset, has
been undermined by HUD’s over-simplification of the planning
process requirements. What occurred is but another version of
paternalism, reflecting a lack of confidence that PHAs could actually
perform the planning functions.
In other regards, it appears to have been difficult for HUD staff to
keep their own personal approaches to PHA management out of the
23.  One continuing vehicle for exercise of control by HUD is the LOCCS system used by
HUD actually to release funds not only committed to specific PHAs and held in the U.S.
Treasury, and only after actually invoices for payment have been submitted by contractors and
formally approved through the applicable PHA procedures for processing vendor payments.
Until HUD personnel specifically release requested funds through this computerized system for
cash management, the funds are unavailable to the PHA. The impact can be serious in terms of
a PHA’s ability to meet its commitments. PHAs are prevented from drawing down funds other
than those required to operate for a short period, sometimes days, and often not until vendor
invoices have been received. The leverage inherent in the ability to withhold some funds until
compliant action on even unrelated matters is obtained from PHA administrators should not be
underestimated. HUD Field Office staff can simply hold up funds with little or no options in the
way of alternatives for PHAs except for interim compliance with what is demanded by HUD
staff. These low visibility actions by HUD staff, therefore, are a potent weapon for imposing
their decisions on PHA operations.
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implementing regulations, even if indirectly. Old habits die hard. This
appears to be true with regard to HUD’s handling of the Neg-Reg
process, in particular. An excessive desire to control the process,
rather than a cooperative effort to work to resolve problems, seemed
to distinguish how HUD handled its role. Attempts to exclude clearly
necessary participants because they challenged HUD in other matters
seemed petty to the outside observer. Similarly, there appears to have
been a far more contentious flavor to the proceedings than should
have occurred. Since the issues involved were essentially dividing a
limited pie (annual grant funds) among applicants, it would appear
that HUD’s role should have been more that of ensuring that all
interests were considered and treated fairly rather than attempting to
dictate desired results.
This evaluation of how the federal government has actually
implemented its devolution despite the rhetoric on the subject
illustrates how difficult it can be to discontinue ingrained habits of
controlling others.24 That use of federal funds are at issue, has
24. See A Report by a Panel of the National Academy of Public Administration for
Congress and the Department of Housing and Urban Development,, Interim Report: Evaluating
Methods for Monitoring and Improving HUD-Assisted Housing Programs, June 2000. The
draft findings issued July 31, 2000, state at p.2, that “HUD’s current monitoring and oversight
systems have significant deficiencies that must be remedied.” The Report notes at p.3, “HUD’s
assessment system is not the product of a strongly consultative culture. . .. PIH’s culture, which
as evolved over many years, does not foster effective consultation with partners and
stakeholders.” The Report’s recommendations include, at p.4: “Modify the current system [for
monitoring and overseeing affordable housing programs] . . . to ensure accountable
performance by housing providers without excessive oversight or intervention in housing
providers’ operations. The system should be adopted to measure outcomes which HUD and its
private and public partners agree on.”
Devolution is clearly understood to be a primary objective for HUD as set forth in the
Report’s recommendation language, at p.6:
The objective should be to transfer to state and local housing agencies and elected
officials substantial flexibility and discretion over the use of funds for legislatively
authorized purposes. those officials should be held accountable for meeting
performance goals through their own political processes and through streamlined HUD
monitoring and oversight mechanisms.
Its current problems and the importance of making these changes in HUD’s existing culture
is reflected in the following language from the Report’s recommendations, at p.7:
Modify the organizational culture in HUD to foster better collaboration between the
department and its housing partners. HUD should transform its organizational culture
and normal way of doing business into one that relies much more heavily on
consultation and collaboration with its stakeholders. Regulation and enforcement,
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provided more than ample justification for federal administrators to
impose controls. Whether new consultative and collaborative norms
will prevail is the issue.
Congress, moreover, demonstrated it was just as likely to
emphasize concerns over financial management issues despite
assertions of devolving responsibility to local governments. That
such controls on local flexibility have continued to be imposed amply
serves to illustrate the inherent conflicts generated when multiple
government levels’ are involved in a particular governmental
function, such as housing assistance.
While a shared government role in provision and management of
housing has been almost universally accepted at all levels of
government, the difficulty posed by continued federal resistance to
allowing local governments significant discretion in using federal
funds undermines the independence sought for PHAs if they are to be
held truly accountable for how they carry out their responsibilities. It
is unfair to ask that local governments fashion solutions to their own
local housing problems if federal administrators continue to impose
rigid administrative requirements on them and constantly second
guess every decision. Worse, imposing uniform requirements without
regard to local circumstances may well condemn governments’
housing role to failure in the long run, especially given the potential
when problems arise on blaming the other level of government for
hindering solutions to the problems..
Local governments are closer to those receiving these services and
they should generally be given the responsibility for handling the
task, subject only to federal review for waste, fraud and abuse, or
failure to comply with civil rights protections or observe essential
tenant interests. At least, the changes realized through the 1998 Act
are a start, and perhaps the federal government will become more
comfortable after building on these initial steps with giving local
governments more authority along with the responsibility to perform.
although necessary, should not be the routine way of conducting day-to-day business.
Voluntary compliance with generally accepted goals and standards should be the
norm. Gaining general acceptance for its modified assessment system will require far
more consultation and collaboration in developing the goals, standards, performance
measures, regulations, and assessment protocols than HUD has practiced in the past.
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